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Abstract
On 26 June 2018, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCI-
TRAL] approved, largely without modiﬁcation, the ﬁnal drafts of the Convention on
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore Conven-
tion) and amendments to the Model Law on International Commercial Mediation pre-
pared by Working Group II. These instruments aim to promote the enforceability of
international commercial settlement agreements reached through mediation in the same
way that the New York Convention facilitates the recognition and enforcement of inter-
national arbitration awards. This paper provides a critical analysis of the Singapore
Convention, and some commentary from an Asian perspective.
On 26 June 2018, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCI-
TRAL] approved, largely without modiﬁcation, the ﬁnal drafts of a Convention on Inter-
national Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore Convention)1
and amendments2 to the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (the
Model Law).3 These instruments were the product of negotiations that began in 2014,
following a proposal made by the US to develop a multilateral convention that would
promote the enforceability of international commercial settlement agreements reached
through mediation in the same way that the New York Convention facilitates the recog-
nition and enforcement of international arbitration awards.4 This paper provides a critical
analysis of the Singapore Convention, and some commentary from an Asian perspective.
* Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore). Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management Uni-
versity. I wish to thank my family for their wonderful support that enabled me to work on this piece.
1. United Nations,Report of UNCITRAL, Fifty-ﬁrst session (25 June-13 July 2018), UNCITRAL, UNDoc.
A/73/17 (2018), Annex I.
2. Ibid., at Annex II.
3. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use
2002, para. 55. In this paper, “conciliation” and “mediation” are used interchangeably to refer to a
process where parties request a third person to assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement
of their dispute.
4. Planned and Possible Future Work—Part III, Proposal by the Government of the United States of
America: Future Work for Working Group II, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL, UN Doc. A/CN.9/
822 (2014).
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i. key elements of the singapore convention
Before addressing the substance of the Singapore Convention, the fact that there was a
convention instead of a softer instrument is an achievement in itself. In the 65th session
of the UNCITRAL Working Group II (the Working Group), many delegations sup-
ported preparing model legislative provisions instead of a convention due to concerns
about the lack of a harmonized approach to the enforcement of settlement agreements,
both in legislation and in practice.5 The Working Group recognized that a binding
instrument such as a convention would bring certainty and would contribute to the
promotion of mediation in international trade.6 However, it also recognized that the
notion of mediation was new in certain jurisdictions and that ﬂexible model legislative
provisions would be more feasible. Nevertheless, at its 66th session, the Working
Group arrived at a creative compromise proposal on ﬁve key issues, including the form
of the instrument, which would involve a model law and convention being prepared
simultaneously.7
A. Scope of Application
Article 1(1) provides for the Singapore Convention to apply to an “agreement resulting
from mediation and concluded in writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute…
which at the time of its conclusion, is international”. The terms “international”,
“writing”, and “commercial” are deﬁned terms.
From an early stage, many in the Working Group felt that the scope of the instru-
ment should be limited to “international” settlement agreements and that clear and
simple criteria should be provided for determining whether this requirement was met.8
The current deﬁnition of “international” in Article 1(1) is based on Article 1(4) of the
Model Law. However, instead of referring to the state with which “the subject matter
of the dispute” is most closely connected, Article 1(b)(ii) refers to “the subject matter of
the settlement agreement”. Article 2(1) further provides for how to determine the
relevant place of business if a party has more than one place of business, and to
stipulate that, in respect of individuals where there is no place of business, reference
may be made to a party’s habitual residence. Article 2(1) of the Singapore Convention
is similar to Article 1(5) of the Model Law. The only difference is that, where a party
has more than one place of business, the relevant place of business has been changed
from that which has the “closest relationship to the agreement to conciliate” to that
which has the “closest relationship to the dispute resolved by the settlement
5. Report ofWorking Group II (Dispute Settlement) on theWork of its Sixty-ﬁfth Session, UNCITRAL, UN
Doc. A/CN.9/896 (2016), at para. 139. See also Edna SUSSMAN, “A Path Forward: A Convention for
the Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements” (2015) 6 Transnational Dispute Management 1 at
5–6, describing the various ways by which mediated settlement agreements can be enforced.
6. Chang-Fa LO, “Desirability of a New International Legal Framework for Cross-Border Enforcement
of Certain Mediated Settlement Agreements” (2014) 7 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 119 at
135–6.
7. Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work of its Sixty-sixth Session, UNCITRAL,
UN Doc. A/CN.9/901 (2017), para. 52.
8. Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Sixty-fourth Session,
UNCITRAL, UN Doc. A/CN.9/867 (2016), para. 94.
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agreement”. These changes are sensible. With respect to Article 1(1), the focus for the
purposes of enforcing a settlement agreement should be on the subject matter of the
agreement, which could be different from the subject matter of the dispute. With
respect to Article 2(1), the focus is rightly placed on the dispute rather than the
agreement to mediate, which could have been part of a dispute resolution clause in the
original contract with little bearing on the eventual dispute.
The “writing” requirement has also been crafted in a practical manner and will be
fulﬁlled if the content of the agreement is “recorded in any form”, including electronic
communications such as electronic mail.
“Commercial” is not deﬁned in the Singapore Convention, but is deﬁned in the
Model Law in a footnote to Article 1(1). This footnote remains unchanged. This is
desirable because, ﬁrst, being consistent with the Model Law may be important to
countries that have adopted the Model Law. Second, non-commercial civil matters
could be subject to quite diverse and localized cultures and legal rules9 which are not
conducive to a harmonized approach of enforcement. Third, retaining a “commercial”
requirement is consistent with the desire to enhance mutual trust in international
business and to facilitate international trade.10
Another limitation to the scope of the Singapore Convention is Article 1(3), which
excludes settlement agreements: (1) that are approved by a court or concluded in the
course of court proceedings; (2) that are enforceable as a judgment in the state of that
court; and (3) that have been recorded and are enforceable as an arbitral award.
The reason for this limitation is the existence of other international instruments such as
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements11 (the Choice of Court Con-
vention) and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards12 (the New York Convention) to govern enforceability of those types of set-
tlement agreements.13 It should be noted that the mere involvement of a judge or
arbitrator would not exclude the settlement agreement from the scope of the Singapore
Convention.14
B. General Principles
The Singapore Convention has avoided prescribing a speciﬁc mode of enforcement, but
has provided guidance on the conditions to be fulﬁlled for a state to enforce a settle-
ment agreement. Article 3(1) states that each State Party “shall enforce a settlement
agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure, and under the conditions laid
down in this Convention”. This is consistent with the New York Convention. Notably,
9. Supra note 6 at 131.
10. Ibid.
11. Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, The Hague, 30 June 2005, online: HCCH
< https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98> .
12. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958,
online: <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf> .
13. The Hague Judgments Project could also potentially lead to the development of another instrument to
enforce settlement agreements that have been recorded as court orders or judgments.
14. Supra note 8 at para. 131.
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the Singapore Convention goes further than the European Union Directive on Med-
iation (the EU Directive),15 which has not produced the hoped-for impact of growing
the use of mediation in the EU.16 Article 6 of the EU Directive does not set out a
procedure for enforceability, but prescribes two essential requirements in broad terms.
First, Member States must ensure that it is possible for the parties, or for one of them
with the explicit consent of the others, to request that the content of a written agree-
ment resulting from mediation be made enforceable. Second, the content of the
agreement must not be contrary to the law of that state and the law of that state must
provide for its enforceability. The ambiguity of this provision is such that it may be
argued that the ability to sue on a mediated settlement agreement according to general
contract law principles would sufﬁce.17 The requirement for explicit consent of the
parties to the application may also pose problems where one party wishes to resist
enforcement. This is not the case with the Singapore Convention, which does not
require consent. Further, unlike the EU Directive, it circumscribes the defences that
may be used to avoid enforcement (Article 5).
Article 3(2) provides that a state shall allow a party to “invoke the settlement
agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure and under the conditions laid
down in [the Singapore Convention], in order to prove that the matter has been already
resolved”. This provision avoids using the tricky term “recognition”, which has been
ascribed different meanings under domestic and international law,18 but instead speaks
to the practical effect of recognition, which is to allow a settlement agreement to be
used as a defence. Consistent with Article 3(1), the exact mode of invocation is left to
the state to determine in accordance with its rules of procedure.
This author is optimistic that the failure to specify a method of enforcement will not
be detrimental. The experience of the New York Convention suggests that the absence
of a single method of enforcement does not impede effective enforcement. The great
divergence in legislation and practice among states concerning the method of enfor-
cement means that it would be unwise to prescribe a single enforcement procedure,
which could jeopardize widespread support for the Singapore Convention. Such sup-
port is needed before the Singapore Convention can serve the purpose of promoting the
use of mediation for cross-border commercial disputes.
C. Requirements for Enforcement
The form requirements of a settlement agreement need to provide certainty and com-
fort to the state of enforcement, but at the same time need to avoid being overly
15. Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21May 2008 on Certain Aspects
of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2008, Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union (L 136).
16. Giuseppe de PALO et al., “Rebooting” the Mediation Directive: Assessing the Limited Impact of its
Implementation and Proposing Measures to Increase the Number of Mediations in the EU (2014, Eur-
opean Parliament Publications Ofﬁce) PE 493.042.
17. Eunice CHUA, “The Future of International Mediated Settlement Agreements: Of Conventions, Chal-
lenges and Choices” (2015) Tan Pan Online: A Chinese-English Journal on Negotiation 1–11. Research
Collection School of Law.
18. Anna K.C. KOO, “Enforcing International Mediated Settlement Agreements” in Muruga Perumal
RAMASWAMY and João RIBEIRO, eds., Harmonising Trade Law to Enable Private Sector Regional
Development (UNCITRAL Regional Centre for Asia and the Paciﬁc, 2017), 91–2.
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prescriptive or detailed such that they complicate the enforcement procedure. Unlike
the New York Convention, which does not contain form requirements for arbitral
awards, the Singapore Convention needs to specify form requirements because settle-
ment agreements can be arrived at after mediation, negotiation, or other means of
informal discussion. Accordingly, Article 4 of the Singapore Convention prescribes
that a party relying on a settlement agreement shall supply to the competent authority
of the state where relief is sought: (1) the settlement agreement signed by the parties;
and (2) evidence that the settlement agreement resulted from mediation. Such evidence
includes the mediator’s signature of the settlement agreement, a document signed by
the mediator indicating that mediation was carried out, an attestation by the institution
administering the mediation, or, in the absence of all of the above, any other evidence
acceptable to the competent authority. As with the earlier writing requirement, the
signing requirement can be met through electronic communication if there is a sufﬁ-
ciently reliable method to identify the parties or the mediator and to indicate their
intention through the electronic communication.
Notably, Article 4 does not exhaustively prescribe the evidence of a settlement
agreement resulting frommediation. It gives several options while leaving it open to the
competent authority in the state of enforcement to accept other types of evidence
should the listed evidence not be available. This approach is advantageous as it allows a
response to the varied circumstances under which settlement agreements may be con-
cluded, for example, the mediator may not be able or willing to sign the settlement
agreement. The reference to attestation by an institution administering the mediation
as one of the recognized types of evidence is particularly helpful given the growing
number of institutions around the world that offer mediation services.
One can imagine further requirements such as an “opt-in” provision in the settlement
agreement that requires the parties to demonstrate awareness of the Singapore Conven-
tion and the result of cross-border enforcement before they can rely on it. At theWorking
Group, it was argued that such a provision could serve the dual purpose of informing
parties who may not be aware of the nature of enforceability of the settlement agreement
and reminding those parties who already do of their obligations.19 It would also be
consistent with the importance placed on party autonomy in the context of mediation.20
However, having an opt-in requirement might run contrary to the broad scope of the
Singapore Convention and raise complexities with the system of allowing declarations.21
For example, it could result in imbalance between the parties seeking enforcement in
different jurisdictions where the settlement agreement may be enforceable in one but not
the other.22 It may also be impractical at the conclusion of a settlement agreement where
parties tend to be focused on the substantive terms of the agreement.23More importantly,
an opt-in approach could be contrary to the expectations of the parties as they would
generally expect the other party to comply with the settlement agreement and thus its
19. Supra note 6 at 131.
20. Supra note 7 at para. 37.
21. Supra note 8 at para. 181.
22. Supra note 7 at para. 40.
23. Supra note 8 at para. 181.
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possible enforcement.24 Ultimately, as part of the compromise proposal at its 66th ses-
sion, the Working Group agreed that the instrument would provide that a party may
declare that it shall apply the Singapore Convention only to the extent that the parties to
the settlement agreement have agreed to the application of the Singapore Convention.
Commentators have also raised other possible requirements relating to the genu-
ineness of the mediation procedure, including the requirement of a neutral third party
serving as mediator,25 and a reference to the voluntariness of the mediation process.26
Instead of adding to the list of requirements for an enforcement application, which
would unduly complicate the application process, the Working Group has wisely dealt
with these concerns through defences to enforcement instead.
D. Defences to Enforcement
Article 5(1) of the Singapore Convention allows a state to refuse relief only if one of the
following grounds can be proved:
(a) A party to the settlement agreement was under some incapacity; or
(b) The settlement agreement sought to be relied upon:
(i) Is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed under the law to
which the parties have validly subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law deemed applicable by the competent authority of the Party to the
Convention where relief is sought under article 4;
(ii) Is not binding, or is not ﬁnal, according to its terms; or
(iii) Has been subsequently modiﬁed;
(c) The obligations in the settlement agreement:
(i) Have been performed; or
(ii) Are not clear or comprehensible;
(d) Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement;
(e) There was a serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable to the
mediator or the mediation without which breach that party would not have
entered into the settlement agreement; or
(f) There was a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties circumstances that
raise justiﬁable doubts as to the mediator’s impartiality or independence and such
failure to disclose had a material impact or undue inﬂuence on a party without
which failure that party would not have entered into the settlement agreement.
24. Supra note 7 at para. 36.
25. Supra note 6 at 132.
26. Ibid., at 133.
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In addition, Article 5(2) permits relief to be refused where it is “contrary to the
public policy” of the State Party in which enforcement is sought or the “subject matter
of the dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation under the law of that Party”.
These defences were formulated by the Working Group to be limited, exhaustive,
stated in general terms, and not cumbersome to implement.27 Most have been drawn
from Article V of the New York Convention with appropriate modiﬁcations to suit the
context of mediation and are relatively uncontroversial.28 For example, Article 5(1)(a)
to (c) are similar to Article V(1)(a) and (e) of the New York Convention, which deals
with incapacity to enter into an arbitration agreement or other invalidity of the arbi-
tration agreement, as well as when an arbitral award has not yet become binding on the
parties or has been set aside or suspended; Article 5(2) of the Singapore Convention
mirrors Article V(2) of the New York Convention, which allows refusal of enforcement
if the “subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of [the country where recognition and enforcement is sought]” and where
recognition or enforcement “would be contrary to the public policy of that country”.
Article 5(1)(d) has no equivalent in the New York Convention but that is only because
it is unique to the mediation context, where a mediation agreement could possibly
preclude or limit enforceability as one of its terms.
Of interest are Article 5(1)(e) and (f), which relate to a serious breach of mediation
standards and failure to disclose circumstances without which the party would not
have entered into the settlement.
An earlier draft of these defences referenced the mediator’s failure to “maintain fair
treatment of the parties” or to disclose circumstances “likely to give rise to justiﬁable
doubts as to its impartiality or independence”.29 Unsurprisingly, they provoked
divergent views in the Working Group. On the one hand, the differences between
mediation and arbitration were highlighted, including the practice of having private
communication with one party in mediation that had no counterpart in arbitration as
well as the limited number of procedural rules governing the mediation process.30
These features together with the conﬁdentiality of mediation meant that it would be
difﬁcult to assess whether the parties were treated fairly. The fact that mediators did
not impose any outcome on the parties and that mediation was a voluntary process
from which parties were free to withdraw at any time also prompted some views that it
was rare for the mediator to make disclosures as to circumstances that may affect the
mediator’s impartiality or independence.31 Some also argued that these defences were
superﬂuous given that there was overlap with some of the existing defences and also
27. Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Sixty-third Session,
UNCITRAL, UN Doc. A/CN.9/861 (2015), at para. 93.
28. Similar defences have been proposed in supra note 6 at 133–4; Chang-Fa LO and Winnie Jo-Mei MA,
“Draft ‘Convention on Cross-Border Enforcement of International Mediated Settlement Agreements’”
(2014) 7 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 387, 397–8.
29. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Working Group II, 65th Session, Settlement of Commercial Disputes—
International Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of International
Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Conciliation, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL,
UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.198 (2016), at para. 35.
30. UNCITRAL, supra note 5 at para. 192.
31. Ibid., at para. 106.
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because mediators were subject to terms of the agreement to mediate and codes of
conduct.32 There were concerns that the inclusion of these defences could lead to
ancillary disputes, especially where the standards were subjective and could be inter-
preted differently.33
However, in response, it was said that the signiﬁcant role of the mediator in con-
cluding the settlement agreement needed to be acknowledged by the retention of these
defences, even if it might be difﬁcult to prove that a party had been treated unfairly in
the process.34 If the parties were not fully informed of any conﬂict of interest or if there
had been some misconduct by a conciliator, there should be legal consequences, par-
ticularly at the enforcement stage, because unlike arbitration, there is no means to
challenge the process or the conduct of the mediator.35
The current provision reﬂects a compromise36 on the issue in three ways. First, it
limits the scope of the defences to instances where the mediator’s misconduct or failure
to disclose had a direct impact on the settlement agreement in that the “party would not
have entered into the settlement agreement”. Second, it adjusts the language of the
defences to highlight the exceptional circumstances that can be raised by using adjec-
tives such as “serious” and “material”. Third, by having the text accompanying the
instrument, it provides an illustrative list of examples of applicable standards.
Although it would take the development of a substantial body of case-law or other
pronouncements by enforcing authorities before it can be said with any certainty what
types of conduct would cross the line, the words used in the defences are sufﬁcient to
establish that the threshold should be high. Whether or not the misconduct of the
mediator was such that a party would not have entered into the settlement agreement
without it would be a ﬁnding of fact that courts and other enforcing authorities are in a
position to make based on available evidence.
E. Reservations
To ensure the integrity of the Singapore Convention, only reservations that are
expressly authorized by Article 8 are permitted, and these are as follows:
(a) [A State Party] shall not apply this Convention to settlement agreements to which it is a
party, or to which any governmental agencies or any person acting on behalf of a gov-
ernmental agency is a party, to the extent speciﬁed in the declaration;
(b) It shall apply this Convention only to the extent that the parties to the settlement
agreement have agreed to the application of the Convention.
These reservations relate to the applicability of the Singapore Convention to set-
tlement agreements to which a government agency or a person acting on behalf of a
32. Ibid., at para. 192; supra note 7 at para. 50.
33. Supra note 7 at para. 50.
34. UNCITRAL, supra note 5 at para. 193.
35. Ibid.
36. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work of its Sixty-seventh Session,
UNCITRAL, UN Doc. A/CN.9/929 (2017), at paras. 96–8.
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governmental agency is party to and the existence of an opt-in requirement. They
essentially reﬂect an agreement to disagree among the members of theWorking Group,
since no consensus emerged on these two issues.
As to whether the Singapore Convention should apply to government entities, the
Working Group considered that a blanket exclusion was not desirable because gov-
ernment entities may be engaged in commercial activities and might seek to use con-
ciliation to resolve disputes in the context of those activities.37 The Working Group
agreed that this matter could be dealt with by way of permitting reservations or
declarations by the states. Nevertheless, the Working Group had difﬁculty settling on
what the default position should be, with this issue only ﬁnally being decided in Feb-
ruary 2018.38
As for the opt-in requirement, although it may be said that permitting such a
declaration would water down the effectiveness of the Singapore Convention, this was
a necessary compromise for the Working Group to progress in the negotiations. One
can always hope that, even if such a declaration is made from an abundance of caution,
it may later be removed once a state becomes more conﬁdent of the usefulness of the
enforcement procedure for international mediation settlement agreements. At least the
default position is for the Singapore Convention to apply regardless of any express
indication by the parties of their agreement to it, suggesting that most of the members
of the Working Group do not foresee that such a declaration would be made.
On balance, although certain compromises were necessary, it was nonetheless a
signiﬁcant achievement that the Working Group prepared an instrument that governs
the enforcement of international mediated settlement agreements.
ii. an asian perspective
The Singapore Convention has great potential to impact the conduct of international
dispute resolution in Asia, where mediation is viewed as a valuable tool to resolve
commercial disputes as it is consistent with Asian sensibilities and culture.39 In an
exploratory survey conducted by the International Institute for Conﬂict Prevention and
Resolution in 2011, out of 122 respondents comprising in-house counsel and external
counsel from the Asia-Paciﬁc region, seventy-two percent indicated that their company
or ﬁrm generally had a positive attitude to mediation (compared to sixty-nine percent
for arbitration) and seventy-eight percent indicated that their company or clients had
used mediation to resolve disputes in the past three years.40
Many Asian countries have actively promoted the use of mediation in recent times.
This has taken the form of, amongst others, enacting mediation legislation or
37. Supra note 27 at para. 46.
38. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work of its Sixty-eighth Session,
UNCITRAL, UN Doc. A/CN.9/934 (2015), at paras. 75–7.
39. See generally, Joel LEE and TEH Hwee Hwee, eds., An Asian Perspective on Mediation (Singapore:
Academy Publishing, 2009).
40. International Institute for Conﬂict Prevention and Resolution, “Attitudes Toward ADR In the Asia-
Paciﬁc Region: A CPR Survey” (2011), online: CPRADR < https://www.cpradr.org/programs/interna-
tional-initiatives/asia/asia/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/asia-paciﬁc-survey.pdf> .
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regulations. For example, the 2012 amendment to China’s Civil Procedure Law
adopted the principle of “mediation ﬁrst” in Article 122; the MalaysianMediation Act
2012, Hong KongMediation Ordinance 2013, and the Singapore Mediation Act 2017
all established frameworks to provide certainty in the use of mediation. Judiciaries have
also issued Practice Directions to encourage the referral of cases to mediation by
incentivizing counsel and the parties to consider and attempt mediation at an early
stage. Examples include Hong Kong’s Practice Direction 31, and paragraphs 35B and
35C of the Singapore Supreme Court Practice Directions. Mediation may also be
encouraged through establishing institutions and policies to promote mediation. China
in 2018 launched an International Commercial Expert Committee to support the set-
tlement of international commercial disputes through mediation and other avenues.41
As part of efforts to enhance public conﬁdence in mediation in Hong Kong, the Hong
Kong Mediation Accreditation Association Ltd was established in 2012 to consolidate
the accreditation process of mediators under a single professional body. In Singapore,
there is an elaborate commercial mediation ecosystem: the Singapore Mediation Cen-
tre and Singapore International Mediation Centre offering commercial mediation
services, the Singapore International Mediation Institute serving as a professional
standards body, and the Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy, the
newest entrant, which was established in 2016, serving as a research institution and
training academy.42
Despite these positive signs, international commercial mediation is presently still
relatively uncommon compared with international commercial arbitration.43 A survey
commissioned by the Singapore Academy of Law, and published in 2016, of 500
respondents including commercial law practitioners, in-house counsel, and public
sector legal professionals in Singapore and around the region reﬂected that seventy-one
percent preferred to use arbitration, twenty-four percent litigation, and a mere ﬁve
percent mediation, with enforceability, conﬁdentiality, and fairness as leading factors
for choosing arbitration.44
The Singapore Convention has the potential to address the concerns with enforce-
ability and allow the positive attitudes towards mediation to lead to growth in the
actual use of mediation. It is important that international commercial disputes in Asia
be settled quickly and efﬁciently, given the expectation of an increase in the number of
disputes in Asia with trade initiatives such as the ASEAN Economic Community,
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership. It would also be in the interests of the numerous Asian
41. “China Launches International Commercial Expert Committee” Xinhua (26 August 2018), online:
Xinhua < http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/26/c_137420632.htm> .
42. See George LIM, SC and Eunice CHUA, “Development of Mediation in Singapore” in George LIM, SC
and Danny MCFADDEN, eds., Mediation in Singapore: A Practical Guide, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Sweet
and Maxwell, 2017), 21.
43. KIM Shi Yin, “From ‘Face-Saving’ to ‘Cost Saving’: Encouraging and Promoting Business Mediation in
Asia” (2014) 32 Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation 158, at 158.
44. Singapore Academy of Law, “Study on Governing Law and Jurisdiction Choices in Cross-Border
Transactions” (2016), online: CIArb < http://www.ciarb.org.sg/singapore-academy-of-law-study-on-
governing-law-jurisdiction-choices-in-cross-border-transaction/> .
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dispute resolution institutions to have greater recognition and enforcement of inter-
national mediated settlement agreements.
Compared with the options of cross-border enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements as a court order and arbitration award, the Singapore Convention presents
amore straightforward, efﬁcient path, given the divergent practice in Asia for enforcing
foreign judgments,45 as well as the complications involved when mixing mediation and
arbitration.46The Singapore Convention will obligate competent authorities to enforce
mediated settlement agreements emanating from other jurisdictions, and restrict the
grounds on which they can decline enforcement.47 The current draft of the Singapore
Convention provides a simple framework for making an enforcement application and
setting out the exceptions to enforcement. It is hoped that Asian jurisdictions will
widely support the Singapore Convention, and thereby usher in a brighter future for
Asian dispute resolution.
45. Adeline CHONG, ed., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia (Singapore: Asian
Business Law Institute, 2017) 3–4.
46. BobetteWOLSKI, “Arb-Med-Arb (andMSAs): AWholeWhich Is Less Than, Not Greater Than, the Sum
of its Parts?” (2013) 6 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 249; Eunice CHUA, “A Contribution to
the Conversation on Mixing the Modes of Mediation and Arbitration: Of Deﬁnitional Consistency and
Process Structure” (2018) 15 Transnational Dispute Management Journal, online: < https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3235429>.
47. Laurence BOULLE, “International Enforceability of Mediated Settlement Agreements: Developing the
Conceptual Framework” (2014) 7 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 35 at 59.
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